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simple contracts, or acts in pais. a different rule has been sometimes asserted.
See a very elaborate and valuable case
to this point in Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St.
520 (1858); 13 Id. 574 (1862) ; Dick
v. Page, 17 Mo. 234 (1852) ; and see
26 Id. 313; Cassiday v. fcKenzie, 4

W. & S. 282 (1842).
But whatever be the instantaneous
effect of the death of the principal, or any
other mode of dissolution, all agree it
cannot terminate an agency or power
coupled with an interest in the subjectmatter of the agency. Whenever, therefore, the agent has an interest, ownership, special property, or lien on property in his hands belonging to his principal, and which he had been authorized
to sell and discharge his claim from the
proceeds, then it is clear such authority
or agency is not terminated by the principal's death, even after it be known to
the agent and to third parties with
whom he is dealing: Hunt v. Rousmanier,
8 Wheat. 174; Knapp v. Alford, 10
Paige 201.
The assignment or transfer of property
to an agent with power to sell or collect,
and pay himself out of the proceeds, is a
fan'iliar illustration of a power coupled
with an interest, and which is not revocable. Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. 565;
(Gaussen v. Morton, 10 B. & C. 731;
Goodwinv. Bowden, 54 Me. 424 ;Roughtailing v. Marvin, 7 Barb. 412; Hodgson v. Anderson, 3 B. & C. 842.

For this reason, a mortgagee of land,
with a power of sale in the mortgage, in
his own name, may make a valid sale
thereof, even after the death of the
mortgagor: Varnum v. Meserve, 8 Allen
158.
But in order to constitute a power
coupled with an interest, it seems the
agent must have some interest in the subject-matterof the agency, and not merely
an interest in the money derived from the
power, when executed, such as to pay
himself out of it for his services as agent,
&c. See Blackstone v. Butternore, 53
Penn. St. 266 ; Bartley's Appeal, Id.
212 ; Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609;
.Houghtailingv. Marvin, 7 Barb. 412.
Of course, as between principal and
agent, the death of the former, per se,
works a revocation, even without notice
to the agent; and the agent has no remedy against the representative of the
principal for services subsequent to hfs
death ; nor has the representative of the
principal any action for the non-fufilment of the agency: Campanariv. Wooa.
burn, 15 C. B. 400 (1854) ; Johnson v.
Wldox, 25 Ind. 182 (1865). It may be
they might recover of him money collected by him for the estate, or for property sold by him before the death, since
assumpsit for money had and received
is an equitable action: Carringer v.
Whittington, 26 Mo. 311 (1858).
EDMUND H. BENNEZT.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United State8.
KIRTLAND v. HOTCHKISS.
A state is not prohibited by the Federal Constitution from taxing, in the hands
of one of its resident citizens, a debt due that citizen by a resident of another state,
such debt being evidenced by the bond of the debtor and the payment of the bond,
secured by deed of trust of real estate, situate in the state in which the debtor resides.

IN error to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
The plaintiff in error, a citizen of Connecticut, instituted this
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action for the purpose of restraining the enforcement of certain tax
warrants levied upon his real estate in the town in which he resided,
in satisfaction of certain state taxes, assessed against him for the
years 1869 and 1870. The assessment was by reason of his own..
ership, during those years, of certain bonds, executed in Chicago,
and made payable to him, his executors, administrators or assigns
in that city, at such place as he or they should, by writing, appoint,
and in default of such appointment, at the Manufacturers' National
Bank of Chicago. Each bond declared that "it is made under,
and is, in all respects, to be construed by the laws of Illinois, and
is given for an actual loan of money, made at the city of Chicago,
by the said Charles W. Kirtland to the said Edmund A. Cummings,
on the day of the date hereof." They were all secured by deeds
of trust, executed by the obligor to one Perkins, of that city, upon

real estate there situated, the trustee having power, by the terms
of the deed, to sell and convey the property and apply the proceeds
in payment of the loan, in case of default on the part of the obligor
to perform the stipulations of the bond.
The statute of Connecticut, under which the assessment was
made, declares, among other things, that personal property in that
state, "or elsewhere," should be deemed, for purposes of taxation,
to include all moneys, credits, cho8es in action, bonds, notes, stocks
(except United States stocks), chattels or effects, or any interest
thereon; and that such personal property, or interest thereon,
being the property of any person resident in the state, should be
valued and assessed, at its just and true value, in the tax-list of the
town where the owner resides. The statute expressly exempts from
its operation money or property actually invested in the business
of merchandising or manufacturing, when located out of the state:
Conn. Revision of 1866, p. 709, tit. 64, ch. 1, sect. 8.
The Supreme Court of the state held that the assessments complained of were in conformity to the state law, and that the law
itself did not infringe any constitutional right of the plaintiff.
This writ of error was then sued out, upon the ground that the
statute of Connecticut, thus interpreted and sustained by its highest
court, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-We will not follow the interesting argument of
counsel by entering upon an extended discussion of the principles
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upon which the power of taxation rests under our system of constitutional government. Nor is it at all necessary that we should now
attempt to state all the limitations which exist upon the exercise
of that power, whether such limitations arise from the essential
principles of free government or from express constitutional provisions. We restrict our remarks to the single question, the precise
import of which appears from the facts of this case.
In McCulloch v. State of faryland, 4 Wheat. 428, this court
considered very fully the nature and extent of the original right
of taxation which remained with the states after the adoption of the
Federal Constitution. It was there said, "that the power of taxing
the people and their property is essential to the very existence of
government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to
which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which the government
may choose to carry it." Tracing the right of taxation to the
source from which it was derived, it was further said: "It is obvious that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive with
that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation, but those
over which it does not extend are, upon the soundest principles.,
exempt from taxation."
"This vital power," said this court, in Providence Bank v. Billing, 4 Peters 568, "may be abused; but the Constitution of the
United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every
abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments.
The interest, wisdom and justice of the representative body, and its
relations with its constituents, furnish the only security, when there
is no express contract, against unjust and excessive taxation, as
well as against unwise legislation."
In St Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 442, and in State Tax on
Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Id. 319, the language of the court was
equally emphatic.
In the last-named case we said that, "unless restrained by prvisions of the Federal Constitution, the power of the state as to the
mode, form and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects
to which it applies are within her jurisdiction."
We perceive no reason to modify the principles announced in
these cases or to question their soundness. They are fundamental
and vital in the relations which, under the Constitution of the
United States, exist between the federal and state governments.
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Upon their strict observance depends, in no small degree, the harmonious working of our complex systems of government, federal
and state. It may, therefore, be regarded as the established doe-'
trine of this court, that so long as the state, by its system of tax%tion, does not entrench upon the legitimate authority of the Union.
or violate any right recognised or secured to the citizen by the
Constitution of the United States, this court, as between the citizen
and his state, can afford no relief against state taxation, however
unjust, oppressive, or onerous.
Plainly, therefore, our only duty is to inquire whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from taxing, in the hands of one
of its resident citizens, a debt held by that citizen upon a resident
of another state, such debt being evidenced by the bond of the
debtor, and the payment of the debt or bond secured by deed of
trust or mortgage upon real estate situated in the state in which
the debtor resides.
The question does not seem to us to be very difficult of solution
The creditor, it is conceded, is a permanent resident within the
jurisdiction of the state imposing the tax. The debt which he
holds against the resident'of Illinois is property in his hands: 15
Wall. 320. It constitutes a portion of his wealth, and from that
wealth he is under the very highest obligation, in common with
his fellow-citizens of the same state, to contribute for the support
of the government whose protection he enjoys.
The debt in question, although a species of intangible property,
may, for purposes of taxation, if not for all purposes, be regarded
as situated at the domicile of the creditor. It is none the less property because its amount and maturity are set forth in a bond.
That bond, wherever actually held or deposited, is at best only
evidence of the debt, not the debt itself. The bond may be destroyed, but the debt-the right to demand the repayment of the
money loaned, with the stipulated interest-remains. Nor is the
locality of the debt, for the purposes of taxation, affected by the fact
that it is secured by mortgage upon real estate situated in Illinois.
The mortgage is but a security for the debt, and, as held by this court
in 15 Wall. 823, already cited, the right of the creditor "to proceed against the property mortgaged, upon a given contingency, to
enforce by its sale the payment of his demand, * * * has no locality independent of the party in whom it resides. It may undoubtedly be taxed by the state when held by a resident therein," &c. :
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III

Cooleyon Taxation 15, 63, 134 and 270. The debt in question, then,
having its situs at the creditor's residence, and constituting a por
tion of his estate there, both he and the debt are, for purposes of
taxation, within the jurisdiction of the state. It is, consequently.
for the state to determine, consistently with its own fundamental
law, whether such property owned by one of its residents shall con-xibute, by way of taxation, to maintain its government. Its
discretion in that regard is beyond the power of the federal government, in any of its departments, to supervise or control, for the
reason, too obvious to require argument in its support, that such
taxation violates no provision of the Federal Constitution. Manifestly it does not, as is supposed by counsel, interfere in any true
sense with the exertion by Congress of the power to regulate commerce among the several states: 8 How. 80; Cooley on Taxation
62. Nor does it, as is further supposed, abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, or deprive the citizer
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or violate
the constitutional guaranty that the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges of citizens in the several states.
Whether the state of Connecticut shall measure the contribution
which persons resident within its jurisdiction shall make by way of
taxes in return for the protection it affords them, by the value of
the credits, choses in action, bonds or stocks -which they may own
(other than such as are exempted or protected from taxation under
the Constitution and laws of the United States), is a matter which
concerns only the people of that state, and with which the federal
government cannot rightfully interfere.
Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
THE STATE v. CHARLES WORDEN.
The Act of 1874 provides, that in all criminal prosecutions the party accused, if
he shall so elect, may be tried by the court instead of by the jury ; and that in such
cases, the court shall have full power to try the case and render judgment. Held,
not to conflict with the provisions of the state constitution, that every person accused ",shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury," and that "1the right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
The statute which provides that every person who shall carnally know and abuse
any female child, under ten years of age, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
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State prison, for not less than seven nor more than ten years, was not intended to do
away with the common-law crime of rape, where committed on a child under ten
years of a_.e.

IJNDICTMENT for rape, in the Superior Court for Fairfield county.
The accused elected, under the Statute of 1874, to be tried by the
court and not by the jury, and he was so tried and convicted. He
then braught the record before this court by a motion in error.
The case is fully stated in the opinion.

.D.B. Lockwood and A. H. Averill, for the plaintiff in error.
J. H. Olmstead, State's Attorney, for the state.
CARPENTER, J.-The prisoner was indicted, tried and convicted
of the crime of rape upon a female under ten years of age. The
trial, at the prisoner's request, was by the court instead of the jury.
The prisoner moved in arrest of judgment on two grounds: 1st.
That under our statute the crime of rape cannot be committed
upon a child under ten years of age; and 2d. That the statute
authorizing him to elect to be tried by the court was unconstitutional and void.
The Superior Court overruled the motion in
arrest, and the prisoner brings the case before this court by a
motion in error.
First. At common law it was legally possible to commit this
crime upon one under ten years of age; that is to say, if the crime
was in every other respect complete; the mere fact that the victim
happened to be under the age of ten years did not make it any the
less a crime. An essential element of the offence is that it be
against the will of the female. Our statute was not intended to
abolish the crime of rape in respect to children under ten, but on
the contrary, was intended to punish with proportionate severity
an act which did not technically constitute a rape. Hence it provides that every person "who shall carnally know and abuse any
female child under the age of ten years, shall be imprisoned in the
state prison not less than seven nor more than ten years." The
punishment for rape is imprisonment for life. There are two distinct offences. The greater includes the less as in many other
instances, but the less does not extinguish the greater. The lattei
requires force and the want of consent. The former dispenses with
both. The age of the female is not an essential element of the
crime of rape, while the statutory offence can only be committed
upon children under ten years of age. The statute was manifestly
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designed to increase, not to diminish, the protection of children of
that tender age, and to throw around them additional safeguards.
We are not disposed to defeat the object of the statute by so construing it as to invite evil-disposed persons to select as their victims
young persons who are least able to protect themselves,.and to
whom the consequences are likely to be more serious.
Second. The Statute of 1874, which was in force when this case
was tried, now repealed, provides that, "In all criminal causes,
prosecutions and proceedings, the party accused may, if he shall so
elect, when called upon to plead, be tried by the court instead of
by the jury; and in such cases the court shall have full power
to hear and try said cause, and render judgment and sentence
thereon."
It is now claimed that that statute is in conflict with the constitution.
There are two clauses, both found in the "Declaration of Rights,"
which bear upon this subject. The first is found in the 9th section,
and clearly refers to the personal rights of a person accused of
crime, and secures to him "a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury." As this section is not much relied on, we pass to consider
the 21st section, which reads, "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate."
Compared with this language the statute would seem to be in
perfect harmony with it. The right to a jury trial remained to the
prisoner. He was not deprived of it, but voluntarily relinquished
it. But it is urged in behalf of the prisoner that the word "right"
has a much broader meaning than is ordinarily attached to it, and
includes the faculty or privilege which individuals have as persons,
as citizens and as members of the body politic, to demand of the
government, acting through all its branches, that certain principles
of governmental administration essential to the liberty and welfare
of the people, shall not be violated; that in this sense it is mainly
political, and the interest in its maintenance purely personal to the
individual is so interwoven with the interest of the citizens and the
body politic that its surrender is placed beyond the power of the
individual.
No one, by simply reading this section, would suppose that the
framers of the constitution intended by it to secure a principle of
government or the political rights of the people collectively or individually. The natural and obvious meaning is to secure to suitors
VOL. XXVIII-15
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and persons accused of crime as individuals, the right and privilege
of having their causes heard and determined iby a jury - and it is
difficult to see how the principles of liberty and self-government, or
the interests of the body politic, can in any way be put in jeopardy
by a waiver of that right. That clause of the constitution applies
to civil as well as criminal causes. The trial by jury in civil causes
has been waived for many years, and now a large portion of such
causes, involving issues of fact, are tried by the court; and yet the
state does not seem to have suffered any detriment. Aside from
questions of public policy, which we will consider presently, we see
as little reason for apprehending trouble from the trial of criminal
causes by the court.
It is further contended that the word "right," as used in the
section under discussion, is synonymous with law. This argument
is drawn from the fact that the Latin word ju8, which is ordinarily
Thus the
translated "right," is sometimes translated "law."
"jus gentium" is the law of nations. But the word "right" is
We must give to it its
seldom used in the sense of "law."
primary and natural meaning, unless there is something which
clearly indicates that it is used in a different sense.
"The law of
Let us substitute the word "1law" for "right."
trial by jury shall remain inviolate." What is its meaning? Two
constructions and two only seem possible. First, we may construe
the word " law" as meaning "right," and that brings us precisely
where we are now, and limits the word substantially to the individual rights of parties. If that interpretation prevails, it is
manifest that the prisoner gains nothing by the substitution.
The only other reasonable construction is to give the word its
ordinary meaning. The effect of that would be to give the then
existing statutes authorizing and regulating trials by jury the force
of a constitutional provision. The absurdity of such a constructior.
will be apparent when we consider that prior to the adoption of the
constitution those laws were frequently changed. Indeed the institution itself of trial by jury, from its first existence to the present
time, has barely preserved its own identity. As it existed when
our constitution was adopted, and as it is now, it is not the product
of any one generation or of any one age; but it is the growth of
centuries, changing and improving with time and experience. It
cannot be possible that the constitution intended to attach itself to
the statute law then in force and make that unchangeable. It aims
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rather to place the right beyond the power of the legislature to
abridge it, and at the same time to leave it in the power of legislation to improve it and adapt it from time to time to the ever
changing phases of human affairs.
If it be attempted to give the word "law" a more indefinite meaning, and interpret this clause as intended to perpetuate the institution
or system of jury trials, the same difficulties will be encountered.
for the institution existed by statute and by the common law
founded on statutes originally. As such it was liable -to modification, if not to repeal. It is true, the institution was so thoroughly
imbedded in the British constitution, that it came to be regarded
as the birthright of every Englishman, and as such was carefully
watched and preserved unimpaired through all changes and even
revolutions. The very fact that it was so jealously guarded, shows
that it was not absolutely irrepealable. Moreover, it was regarded
as the personal right of every one to have his cause tried, or be
tried himself, if accused of crime, by a jury; so that the word
"right," in its ordinary sense, expresses the idea more clearly and
forcibly than any other, and in that sense alone we think it was
ased.
It is farther claimed, that the right of trial by jury, covers not
only the personal privilege of a single suitor or accused person, but
also the interests of jurors, judges and all citizens in benefits direct
and indirect, which the framers of the constitution believed to be
involved in the institution of trial by jury.
The interests, feelings and desires of judges and jurors as such
we pass by, simply remarking, that probably the framers of the
constitution did not deem them of sufficient importance to make
them even remotely or incidentally the subject of a constitutional
provision. In respect to the interests of the public at large, it is
quite different. Those interests, might, with propriety, perhaps
have been protected had it been considered desirable. If such had
been the intention, we should expect to find somewhere in the constitution, language adapted to that end. We should expect too,
that they would deal with that purpose directly and explicitly.
Hence, it would not have been left in doubt, nor would it have been
hidden in a provision apparently designed to secure personal rights
of individuals. We find in the Constitution of the United States,
which was in force when our constitution was framed, the explicit
provision, "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach-
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ment, shall be by jury." It would have been easy for our conveii
tion to have been equally explicit. The fact that the interests of
the public in this regard, were not expressly provided for, furnishes
a strong presumption that it was not intended to place the matter
beyond legislative control. With the Constitution of the United
States before the convention, the omission is significant.
Another ground on which the validity of this statute is questioned, is that it is contrary to public policy. That the law is impolitic and uilwise, especially in its application to capital cases and
felonies generally, we are ready to concede to the fullest extent.
We cannot believe that it is wise or expedient to place the life or
liberty of any person accused of crime, even by his own consent,
at the disposal of any one man or two men, so long as man is a
fallible being. But that is a question for the legislature, and the
legislature has reconsidered the matter and very properly repealed
the obnoxious law. We are dealing not with a question of expediency but of constitutional power. The judiciary has power to
declare a statute void for unconstitutionality, and will exercise that
power only in clear cases. But we know of no principle of jurisprudence that will justify the court in avoiding a statute on the
ground that it is contrary to sound policy. Such a decision would
manifestly be an encroachment upon the domain of legislation.
We may properly have regard to questions of policy and expediency
in applying the principles of the common law, but with the policy
or impolicy of a plain statute we have nothing to do. We have no
provision in our constitution prohibiting the legislature from violating principles of sound policy by passing unwise laws.
A brief reference to some of the decisions cited in the argument
will close this discussion.
In our own state it was held that inasmuch as there was no
statute conferring upon the Superior Court the power to try a criminal charge, except through the intervention of a jury, that court
without a jury had no power to try it: State v. Maine, 27 Conn.
281.
Courts elsewhere have held the same doctrine, and to such an
extent that it may now be regarded as the established law. The
reason is obvious: the law had provided only one tribunal to try
criminal causes-the court and jury. The Superior Court, without
a jury, in respect to criminal causes, was unknown to the law.
Crimes, in a free, civilized country, ought never to be punished,

STATE v. WORDEN.

117

except through the intervention of the legally constituted tribunals.
But as the statute we are now considering expressly authorizes the
Superior Court to try criminal charges, those decisions are inap.
plicable.
There are decisions in which it is held, especially in capital cases,
that it is incompetent for the prisoner to waive the constitutional
and statutory jury of twelve men: Cancemi v. The People, 18 N.
Y. 128, and cases following that decision. They hold in effect that
the absence or disqualification of one or more of the panel cannot
be waived, and that a verdict by a jury of less than twelve is not a
verdict by a legal jury. In capital cases, in favor of life the law
will not allow the prisoner to agree to be tried by less than twelve
jurors, as that would be in effect to substitute another tribunal for
that established by the constitution and laws: a species of arbitration. Those cases are unlike this. In them the question was,
whether a man could lawfully be tried by a tribunal not known or
recognised by law. In this case the question is, whether it is competent for the legislature to provide two tribunals, and authorize
the trial of the prisoner by one or the other, at his election. If a
statute should authorize the trial of a prisoner, with his consent, by
eleven jurors, that would present a case more analogous to this.
But in cases not capital, it has been held that the disqualifications
of a juror may be waived, and that, by consent, a verdict may be
rendered by eleven jurors.
Commonwealth v. Daily, 12 Cush. 80, was a prosecution for a
misdemeanor. During the trial, one juror was withdrawn, and by
consent entered of record the trial proceeded before eleven jurors.
The verdict was sustained mainly on the ground that the defendant,
having waived the objection and taken the chances of a favorable
verdict, was precluded from taking the exception after verdict.
State v. Tullu, 34 Conn. 280, was a prosecution for embezzlement. After the jury retired, and before rendering their verdict,
it came to the knowledge of the defendant's counsel that a juror
bad, before the trial, formed and expressed the opinion that the
defendant was guilty. This was not brought to the attention of
the court until after the verdict was rendered. It was held that
the disqualification was waived and judgment was rendered on the
verdict.
There are other similar cases, but it is unnecessary to refer to
them.
In Ohio, a statute defining the jurisdiction and regulating the
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practice of Probate Courts, provided that "upon a plea other than
a plea of guilty, if the defendant do not demand a trial by jury,
the probate judge shall proceed to try the issue," was held to be no
infringement of the constitution: Daily v. State, 4 Ohio St.
Rep. 57 ; Dillingham v. State, -5 Id. 280 ; Ward v. The People,
30 Mich. 116, is to the same effect.
We find no case in which it is held that the legislature has no
power to provide for the trial of criminal cases by the court, while
statutes applying to misdemeanors have been held valid where the
right to a jury trial remained. In respect to this question of constitutional power, we know of no distinction between capital offences
and others, between felonies and misdemeanors.
In respect to the question of waiver, in its application to a single
juror, courts have distinguished between the higher and lower
grades of crime. In its applications to a jury trial altogether, they
have held that there can be no waiver in any case unless authorized
by statute, and unless the statute has conferred jurisdiction upon
the court. But under the constitution all crimes are upon the
same footing in respect to the forum in which they can be tried.
If the statute may authorize the court to try one, we see no reason
why it may not authorize the court to try all. Such acts have been
held constitutional; we know of no case in which it has been held
otherwise.
For the reasons given, we think the act in question, so long as
it remained unrepealed, was a valid enactment. There is no error.
The other judges concurred, except PARK, C. J., who dissented.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO. v.
HALLOWELL.
A common carrier is liable as an insurer for loss to goods in his charge, except
where it occurs through the act of God or the public enemy.
The "public enemy" means a government at war with our government. Robbers, rioters and insurrectionists, no matter how great and overwhelming the force
they use, are not public enemies, and their acts are not an excuse to the carrier.
But such liability as insurer does not attach until after the goods are received by
carrier for transportation. For delay in receiving and carrying goods the arer is not an insurer, and is only liable for breach of his contract or of his public
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duty: and unexpected and overwhelming riot and violence will excuse delay necessarily caused thereby.
The fact that a riot is caused by the reduction of the pay of railroad employees,
will not prevent the riot being a sufficient excuse for delay in the transportation of
goods.
APPEAL

from the Madison Circuit Court.

J.-Oomplaint by the appellee as a shipper, against the
appellant as a common carrier, to recover damages for delay in
receiving and transporting live stock. A demurrer, for the alleged
want of facts, was overruled. The appellant answered by a general
denial and six special paragraphs. Trial by the court, and finding
for appellee.
The second paragraph of answer was in the following words:
"For a second and further answer to the second and third paragraphs of complaint, the defendant says that during the entire time
of the delay in shipping the plaintiff's stock, as charged in said par.
agraph of complaint, a portion of the citizens of the state of Indi.ana were in rebellion against the laws and government of said state,
and assembled together along the line of defendant's railroad, over
which it was necessary to pass to carry said stock to the place of its
destination, to 1'it: East Liberty, Pennsylvania, with clubs, stones,
pistols and other dangerous weapons, and with the use of force,
threats, and intimidation, drove the defendant's locomotive engi.
neers, firemen, and other servants necessary to run a train, away
from defendant's trains, then ready and prepared to transport the
plaintiff's hogs at the time agreed on; that said persons so in open
rebellion, and armed as aforesaid, during all said delay, to wit:
from said 26th day of December 1873, until said 3d day of January
1874, continued to assemble themselves together along the line of
said railroad as aforesaid, and with force and violence drove away
from the defendant's trains and engines, the engineers and firemen
employed by the defendant to operate its trains; and that the persons so in rebellion and resisting the la's of the state of Indiana,
and resisting the defendant in the lawful operation of its said railroad, were so numerous that the civil authorities of the state were
unable to resist and suppress them, and that it became necessary for
the governor of the state of Indiana to call out the military force
of the state to suppress them.
"And that he did call out said military force and suppressed said
rebellion on the 2d day of January 1874, and that the defendant,
on or as soon thereafter as it was possible to do so, to wit, on the 3d
]IDDLE,
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day of January 1874, sent a proper train of cars to where said
stock was to be re-shipped from, and without further delay transported said stock to their place of destination, wherefore the defendant says it was prevented by the enemies of the governmbnt in
open rebellion from transporting the plaintiff's hogs sooner than it
did transport them, as alleged in the complaint."
The third, fifth, sixth and seventh paragraphs of answer set up
substantially the same facts as those averred in the second. The
fourth paragraph was withdrawn.
The second paragraph of reply was pleaded to the second, third,
fifth, sixth and seventh paragraphs of answer. It averred that the
pretended rebellion set up in the defendant's answer was caused
by a reduction of the wages of the engineers, firemen and employees of the defendant, which induced them to strike or refuse to
go to work, and they assembled peacefully in a body and demanded
their wages restored, but neither offered nor threatened any resistence to the civil authorities of the state.
The third paragraph of reply is in the following words: "And
for third and further reply to the second, third, fifth, sixth and
seventh paragraphs of defendant's answer, he says that all the
obstruction and disturbance that occurred, as set out in the said
answer, was caused by an unjust and oppressive order of said
defendant in cutting down and reducing the wages of her engineers, firemen and employees, and thus causing her employees to
refuse to work and become sullen and turbulent. And that said
employees assembled in a small body, and demanded a revocation
of said order, and a restoration of their former wages ; and that
none but the employees of this defendant engaged in any way in
said disturbance."
Upon the issues thus settled the case was tried. The only objection made to the complaint is that it does not aver any consideration
for the contract to ship the stock; but it showed the relation of
common carrierand shipper between the parties, and an agreenmnt
on the part of the appellee to furnish the stock to be shipped, and
on the part of the appellant to ship the stock, and that the stock
was furnished at the proper depots, and a part of it loaded upon
the appellant's cars. These facts show the contract and a sufficient consideration to support it. We think- the complaint is
good: Railroad Co. v. Morton, May Term 1878.
The appellee insists that is immaterial whether this second and
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third reply to the appellant's answer is good or not, because, as he
also insists, the paragraphs of answer to which they were pleaded
are not good.
It is generally held, that to excuse a common carrier, the loss
must happen from a strictly superior force, not merely human,
unless it be the public enemy, the vis major of the civil law: Redf.
on Carriers, sect. 25. But the carrier will be exempted from losses
caused by public enemies, as by a hostile invasion and seizure or
destruction of the property, or by the capture of the carrier's vessel
and cargo on the high seas, by the men-of-war or commissioned privateers of the nation with which we are in open war. " To make a
public enemy, the government of a foreign country must be at war
with the United States; for a mob, how numerous soever it may be,
or robbers, whoever they may be, are never considered as a public
enemy :" Boav. Dic., Public Enemy.
Rioters, and robbers, and thieves, and insurrectionists, though at
war with social order, are not in this sense classed as public enemies. Though the force by which a carrier be assailed be never so
great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, he is
nevertheless chargeable. Pirates upon the high seas, however,
stand as an exception to this rule. They are considered the enemies
of all civilized nations, and indeed of the human race, whose depre.
dations upon a common carrier will excuse him from liability: Edwards on Bailments 463.
The carrier is answerable for loss caused by the irresistible force
and violence of robbers and mobs; and thieves and rioters, insurgents who are merely private depredators, are not considered public
enemies, in the legal sense of the term: Angell on Carriers, sees.
191, 200.
It has long been settled in England that a common carrier is
responsible for all losses, except such as are occasioned, to speak in
the quaint language of the common law, "by the act of God or the
king's enemies." The true reason is given by Sir WILLIAM JONES,
namely, that the carrier's engagement is a public employment,
which gives him easy facilities and affords great temptation to combine secretly with robbers, to the infinite mischief of commerce and
extreme inconvenience to society. To which reasons may be added,
that when goods are delivered to a common carrier, they are no
longer under the control of the owner. If they should be lost by
the grossest carelessness of the carrier or negligence and dishonesty
VoL. XXVIII.-16
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of his servants, or be stolen by thieves in collusion with them, the
owner would be unable to prove the facts except by those who had
committed the wrong, and who would thus be strongly tempted to
excuse their master, as well as themselves: Angell on Carriers,
sees. 149, 150, 191, 200.
The law against common carriers when the goods are lost, seems
severe, but its severity is necessary to the security of property and
the protection of commerce, and is founded in experience and the
deepest wisdom.
The first case we find reported under Charles II. It is this:
The carrier loaded his vessel in the river Thames for Cadiz, in
Spain. She was manned by five sailors, which was sufficient to
sail her. In the night time came eleven persons, under pretence
of pressing seamen for the King's service, and by force seized the
sailors and took the goods. The case was compromised before a
final decision, but it was agreed on all hands that the master should
have answered, in case there had been any default in him or his
mariners: 1torse v. Slue, Ventris 190.
The first case reported in this state is Walpole v. Bridges, 5
Blackf. 322, wherein Judge DAWES gives a construction to the phrase
"act of God," but does not define a public enemy. In this case it
was held that the exception in a bill of lading, "unavoidable accidents of the road only excepted," did not restrict the general
liability of a common carrier. The following cases support this
view more or less directly: Proprietorsof the Trent -avigation Co.
v. Wood, 3 Espinasse 127; Lane v. Cotton, I Ld. Raym. 652 ;
Bell v. Reed, 4 Binn. 129; Murphy v. Staton, 3 MHunford 239 ;
Ewart v. Street, 2 Bailey 157 ; MAcArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 190 ;
Blackstock v. The N. Y. & Erie Railroad Co., i Bosworth 79.
But the strict rule contended for by the appellee is applicable to
common carriers only after they have received the goods for transportation and fail to deliver them at their destination, or where
they are lost. In cases like the present, for 'delay in receiving and
carrying the goods, the carrier is not an insurer, and is bound only
by the general rule of liability for a breach of his contract, or of
his public duty as a carrier, and may be excused for his delay in
receiving the goods, or in transporting them after they have been
received, when the delay is necessarily caused by unforeseen disaster
which human prudence cannot provide against, or by accident not
caused by negligence of the carrier, or by thieves and robbers, ox
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an uncontrollable mob. Under this view we think the 2d, 3d, 5th,
6th and 7th paragraphs of appellant's answer are each sufficient:
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis .RailroadCo. v. Morton, 61

Ind. 539.
The appellant insists that the 2d and 3d paragraphs of reply to
its answer are both insufficient. As to the second paragraph, we
think this view is correct. The fact that a railroad company has
reduced the wages of its employees cannot be held to justify or excuse a mob composed of indiscriminate persons, in stopping a train
of cars and delaying the receiving of goods or the transportation of
freights. Nor can the railroad company be held responsible for the
consequences of such unlawful proceedings when they cause such
delay.
A majority of the court also hold the 3d paragraph of the reply
insufficient. They think that a fair construction of its averments
mean no more than that the employees committed the acts alleged
against them in the reply after they had refused to work for the
company, and thus had severed their relations with the road, and
had therefore ceased to be its employees. If this is the fair construction of the reply it is insufficient. But the writer of this opinion is constrained to differ from the majority of the court on this
point. He cannot see how the language of the averments can
fairly bear such a construction. The persons alleged to have created the disturbance and caused the delay are averred to be the
employees of the appellant throughout the reply, and the concluding sentence, which must be taken as referring to what precedes it,
clearly means, "that none but the employees of the defendant engaged, in any way, in said disturbance."
The reply, as the writer construes it, puts the fact whether the
persons causing the delay complained of were the employees of the
appellant as not directly in issue, and as it was thus presented to
the court for trial and found against the appellant, the judgment
ought to be affirmed; for it is a well-settled principle of law that a
delay caused by a "strike," or a mob composed solely of the employees of a railroad company, as averred in the reply before us,
will not excuse the company from receiving and carrying freight
according to its contract or public duty: Redfield on Carriers, sect.
28 ; Edwards on Bailments, sect. 609; Conger v. Hudson River
Railroad Co., 6 Duer 375; Persons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. 215;
Blackstoek v. rew, Fork ? -ErieRailroad Co., 20 N. Y. 48; Con-
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diet v. Te Grand Trunk RailroadCo., 54 Id. 500. For the error
in overruling the demurrer to the 3d paragraph of reply, the judgment must be reversed.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
KINEALY

ET AL. V.

ST. LOUIS, K. C. AND N. RAILWAY CO.

Where a highway is altered, obstructed, or altogether vacated, no action will lie
for damages caused thereby, except for one who is specially injured, and the same
rule should be applied to railroads as to other highways.
Whether a corporation has violated its charter can only be inquired into at the
suit of the state, or of a private citizen who has suffered special damage by the acts
complained of.
The depreciation in value of neighboring real estate, by the removal of a railroad
depot and change of route, is not such special damage to each individual landholder
as will give him a standing to question the right of the corporation to make the
change.
The case of Railroad Co. v. Compton, 2 Gill 20, dissented from.
Where a duty arises for the public benefit, as to build a railroad under a charter,
there is no implied contract or duty to individuals, either to construct it in the first
instance or to maintain it afterwards, and therefore no action in favor of an individual can be maintained for its alteration or discontinuance.
APPEAL

from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

The petition for damages set out the incorporation of the defendant company and the laying out of their road, including a depot at
Jennings' station; that relying on the establishment of such depot,
and on the faith of its maintenance, plaintiffs purchased certain
land at Jennings' station and expended large sums of money in
the improvement thereof; that subsequently defendant, without
any new or other legal authority than that contained in the charter
which had been already executed as above stated, built a new line
of road and depot at Fourteenth street, in the city of St. Louis, and
abandoned Jennings' station as a passenger line and depot, and disused it except for a local freight line and station; that such change
and abandonment were unauthorized and unlawful, and by reason
thereof the value of plaintiffs' lands was greatly decreased, to their
damage, &c.

To this petition there was a demurrer, which was sustained by
the Circuit Court, whereupon plaintiffs appealed.
JT. .Kinealy, for plaintiffs.-The change of route constituted an
abandonment. The use made of the new line shows that it is the
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orks v. Junction Railroad,5
main line, and not a mere branch:
McLean 425. A branch means a subordinate line to some other
point, not a re-location of the main terminus: Morris, fc., Bailroad Co. v. Central Bailroad, 31 N. J. Law 208; Newhall v.
Galena, fc., Railroad,14 Ills. 273. There can be no abandonment or re-location without express authority: Turnpike Co. v.
Hffosmer, 12 Conn. 356 ; Little Miami Bailroad Co. v. Naylor, 2
Ohio St. 235; Blakemore v. Canal Co., 1 M. & K. 162: s. c. on
appeal, 1 C1. & Fin. 262; Hudson, &c., Co. v. New York & Brie
Railroad Co., 9 Paige 323; State v. Norwalk, &c., Co., 10 Conn.
157. The change being unauthorized, plaintiffs may recover damages: B. & S. RailroadCo. v. Compton, 2 Gill 36; Tack8on v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St. 168; N. 0. Railroad Co. v. M1Ioye, 39 Miss. 374.
Plaintiffs having suffered special damage, may raise the question of
violation of defendant's corporate powers: Lackland v. N. Mo.
Railroad Co., 31 Mo. 184; Atkinson v. Railroad Co., 15 Ohio
St. 36; Carlin v. Paul, 11 Mo. 32.
. H. Blodgett, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, J.-Whether the defendant acted in violation of its
charter, when constructing its new, and in withdrawing its trains
from its old route, past Jennings' station, is a question we do not
propose to discuss, as it is a question which can only be raised by
the state, except where such collateral inquiry by a private citizen
is expressly granted by law: Martindale v. Railroad Co., 60 Mo.
510, and cases cited. But disregarding any consideration of this
nature, the plaintiffs' standing in court is not thereby bettered;
for they do not allege that the injury complained of is one special
and peculiar to the party complaining; an injury, in short, not
shared by the other members of the community. For aught that
appears in the petition, every lot-owner in Jennings', every owner
of real estate in the vicinity, is as much damaged as is the wife of
plaintiff by the withdrawal of defendant's trains, and the consequent depreciation in the value of real estate.
It is well settled that where a highway is altered, obstructed ol
altogether vacated, that no action will lie except by him who "has
greater hurt or incommodity than every other man has :" Holman
v. Townsend, 13 Met. 297; Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147, and
cases cited; Brainardv. Railroad Co., 48 Vt. 107.
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In the case last cited, where a plank-road had been located
through the plaintiff's land, which route was afterwards condemned
and applied to the use of a railroad company, it was said that "the
injury that the plaintiff sustained by the loss of the use of the
plank-road, is one that he sustains in common with the whole public. Every person who was accommodated by the use of the plankroad, sustains an injury of the same character and kind, differing
only in degree, whether -he lives upon the line of the road or elsewhere. The same injury would result from the abandonment of the
road or from extinction from any cause. All the authorities agree
that for such injuries damages are not allowed. But in the same
it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages resulting from
a destruction of the plank-road, because owing to such destruction,
he was compelled to construct a private road from his buildings to
the public highway, thereby sustaining an injury not common to
the public generally but one peculiar to himself. To the same effect
are Proprietors of Quincy Canal Co. v. Neucomb, 7 Met. 276;
Smith v. (Cty of Boston, 7 Cush. 254; Angell on Highways,
§§ 283 and 285, and cases cited; Stone v. Railroad Co., 68 Ills.
394; Proprietorsof Locks and Canals v. Railroad Corporation,
10 Cush. 385.
In Ohio, a different rule prevails, as to the alteration of a highway, but it is there recognised as a clear exception to the rulo
prevalent elsewhere. But even in that state it is held that no right
of recovery exists where the plaintiffs' property was not taken, and
where the alteration merely rendered the road less convenient for
travel, without directly impairing his access to the road from the
improvements on his land: Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St. 163.
So, that even in that state, the doctrine of a special injury in order
to a right of recovery is recognised as fully as in the Vermont
Case, supra. In Railroad Co. v. Naylor, 2 Ohio St. 235, the
railway had been located and operated on a certain street for some
time, but the company, without authority of law, re-located their
road, and in so doing, ran within a few feet of the premises of
Naylor and in front of his house, used both for a dwelling and
grocery, thus impairing the value of his house as a dwelling, and
ruining it as a grocery-stand; and he was held entitled to recover.
But confessedly, that right of recovery was based upon the ground
of the direct and special injury sustained, for this was the very
gravanen of the action.
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The case of Railroad Co. v. Compton, 2 Gill 20, so strongly
relied on by plaintiffs, as being directly in point in their favor, is
not an elaborately considered case, nor are any arguments, or
reasons given, or authorities cited for the conclusion reached. But,
still, I think it will perhaps be found that even that case proceeds
upon the general theory heretofore announced, of an injury to the
party complaining different from that suffered by the rest of the
community. For it is expressly said in the opinion: "The question to be tried by the jury impannelled in the county court, was
the extent of the injury which resulted to the plaintiffs by the
abandonment and discontinuance of the railway on their lands, and
its location and construction on the lands of another person." This
language would seem to indicate that the plaintiffs desired legal
redress for injuries peculiar to themselves, as landowners, in the
deprivation of facilities theretofore enjoyed by them, by reason of
the withdrawal of the railway from their lands. If this is the
theory of that case, the correctness of the conclusion arrived at
cannot be questioned. But the case is very obscurely and unsatisfactorily reported, and if it is to be understood in a different way
than that I have stated, it is certainly at variance with the principle asserted in the cases already cited; and no reason is seen
why the same doctrine should not control in relation to actions by
private individuals for the abandonment of railway routes, as well
the abandonment of any other highways whatsoever.
If the same principle is to control in each class of cases, then it
is quite clear that plaintiffs by failing to allege an injury sustained
special in its nature to themselves, have failed to state any ground
of recovery-and no case, except perhaps in Maryland, even remotely intimates a contrary view; the cases cited from our own
reports and the one cited from Mississippi certainly do not. I take
it that there is wide difference between a private individual bringing suit against a railway company for special damage, for obstructing the street in front of his lot, thus cutting off every opportunity
of ingress or egress, as in the Lackland case, and the more recent
one of Tate v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 149, and the bringing of a
similar suit, where no damage is alleged, because a railway company
has discontinued its trains or abandoned its road. Whatever redress
is to be afforded under the last-mentioned circumstances, can be
obtained only by the authority which granted its franchises to the
derelict company: Attorney Generalv. Railway Co.. 36 Wis. 467.
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Again, there was no contract between the railway company and
plaintiffs, either expressed or implied, that the company should continue to maintain its road or run its trains. "Whenever an action
is brought for a breach of duty, the party bringing it must show
that he has an interest in the performance of the duty and that the
duty is imposed for his benefit, and when the duty is imposed for
the benefit of another, or for thepublic benefit and his own advantage, is merely incidentaland is no part of the design of the statute,
no such right is created as forms the subject of action." Field
on Damages, § 39. Here, it is evident that the construction
of the road and its maintenance were authorized by legislative
enactments solely for the "public benefit," and not for the benefit
of any individual composing the public. So that, as between the
plaintiffs and the defendant company, there is neither breach of contract nor breach of duty, and consequently no right of action. And
this case, therefore, so far as concerns plaintiffs, stands precisely as
if they had bought lots and built thereon, contiguous to any other
public improvement on the faith of the continuance of such improvement.
A recent writer observes, in reference to the discontinuance of
such improvements: "There is no contract with surrounding property owners, that a public improvement shall always exist as at
present; and no damages will be allowed for its discontinuance,
notwithstanding improvements may have been made on the supposition that they will remain, and not withstanding property has
been thereby enhanced in value :" Mills on Eminent Domain,
§ 317; Brooklyn Park v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the judgment
should be affirmed.
HOUGH, J., concurred merely in the result.

